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The standard explanation of infants’ search failures with hidden objects, despite an
apparent sensitivity to them, is a deficit in the means–end skill for retrieving objects
from occluders. Studies equating means–end demands for retrieving toys from trans-
parent and opaque barriers challenge this account by showing that infants succeed
more with visible objects. However, they suffer from a critical limitation: Infants may
retrieve visible objects without noticing the transparent barriers in front of them. We
addressed this concern by requiring infants to notice a barrier to retrieve a toy and spe-
cifically to pull down a rotating screen to retrieve a toy from behind it.
Seven-month-olds used this means–end skill more often with a transparent barrier
than an opaque one. Thus, neither a means–end deficit nor an ability to ignore trans-
parent barriers fully accounts for search failures. Relations to other findings challeng-
ing the means–end deficit account and implications for approaches to studying cogni-
tive development are discussed.
Why do infants fail to search for hidden objects before 8 to 10 months when they
seem sensitive to hidden objects months earlier in other measures? The prevailing
explanation is that infants lack the means–end skill for retrieving objects from
occluders. Recent evidence challenges this means–end deficit account but suffers
from a specific limitation. The study presented here addresses this limitation, defin-
itively challenging the means–end deficit explanation and highlighting the need for
theoretical accounts that address both successes and failures with hidden objects.
The traditional explanation for infants’ search failures before 8 to 10 months
was that they lack the concept of object permanence (Piaget, 1954). However,
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manual search may be inadequate for measuring young infants’ knowledge; search
may be too difficult because of other limited abilities. Because of this criticism, re-
searchers have used other paradigms to investigate infants’ knowledge about hid-
den objects. In violation-of-expectation studies, infants watch events in which
hidden objects undergo either possible or impossible transformations while their
looking times to the events are measured (e.g., Baillargeon, 1993; Spelke,
Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Wynn, 1992). In many such studies,
infants as young as 3.5 months look longer at impossible than possible events. The
conclusion is that infants know hidden objects exist, are surprised to see their exis-
tence violated, and therefore look longer. Thus, when reaching is not required, in-
fants seem sensitive to hidden objects.
Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until months later? Accord-
ing to theprevailingmeans–enddeficit account, infantsknowtheobjectcontinues to
exist but cannot coordinate the actions to uncover it in a means–end sequence (e.g.,
Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990; Bower & Wishart, 1972; Diamond,
1991). The hidden object is the end, and removing the occluder is the means. Infants’
reaching in the dark supports the means–end deficit account. Infants reach for ob-
jects concealed by darkness, which allows a direct reach rather than requiring a
means–end sequence, before they reach for objects occluded by a barrier in the light
(e.g., Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, & Perris, 1991; Hood & Willatts, 1986).
Despite this supportiveevidence,however,otherevidencesuggestsameans–end
deficit cannotbe thesolecauseof infants’ failures insometasksandsuccesses inoth-
ers. Even when means–end demands are equated for retrieving visible and hidden
toys, infants retrieve visible toys more often and demonstrate little sensitivity to hid-
den toys. One approach equates means–end demands by introducing them into a vis-
ible condition. If infants demonstrate means–end skill with a transparent barrier,
then failure with an opaque barrier cannot be due solely to a means–end deficit. In-
fants who watch as objects are placed behind transparent and opaque barriers re-
trieve them more often in the transparent condition (e.g., Bower & Wishart, 1972;
Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997; Shinskey, Bogartz, & Poirier,
2000). Another approach equates means–end demands by taking them away from
both visible and hidden events. For example, 6-month-olds presented with objects
visible in water or hidden in milk retrieved visible objects more often, even though
they could reach directly in both cases (Shinskey, 2000). This collection of results
challenges the means–end deficit account. Such patterns are not observed when the
behavior does not serve as a means to an end (Munakata, Bauer, Stackhouse, &
Tobiasson, 2000), indicating that the behaviors are truly means–end in nature rather
than reflecting simple arousal or dishabituation.
However, previous studies equating means–end demands for visible and hidden
events suffer from a critical limitation: The means–end demands may not be truly
equated. Infantscouldsucceedat retrievalwithoutevennoticing the transparentbar-
rier. For example, an infant presented with an object under a transparent cup may try
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to reach directly for the object without noticing the cup, inadvertently displace the
cup, and then retrieve the toy (Munakata et al., 1997). This is unlikely to occur with
an opaque cup, which cannot be ignored like a transparent one. Although Munakata
et al. (1997) controlled for such inadvertent retrievals by having the toy beyond
reach, the visible event may appear simpler because the transparent screen can be ig-
nored, giving infants one less thing to think about during visible events (E. Spelke,
personal communication, April 1995). Thus, in all previous studies in which
means–end demands for retrieving visible and occluded objects were ostensibly
equated, the demands may have been higher in the occluded case; as a result,
means–endlimitationsmayhaveprevented infants fromretrievinghiddenobjects.
We addressed this concern by creating a transparent event in which infants had
to notice and use a drawbridge-like screen as a means to get a toy. If they ignored
the screen, they failed to get the toy. Seven-month-old infants witnessed events in
which either a toy or no toy was placed behind either a transparent or an opaque
screen, and we measured how often they pulled down the screen. According to the
means–end deficit account, infants should discriminate similarly between toy
presence and absence with the transparent and opaque screens because the two
screens require the same means–end skill. In contrast, we predicted that infants
would discriminate more between toy presence and absence when the screen was
transparent than when it was opaque.
METHOD
Participants
Sixteen full-term 7-month-old infants (M = 7 months, 3 days; range = 6;27 to 7;8; 8
girls and 8 boys) from the Denver, Colorado, area participated. Sixteen additional
infants were tested but not included in the sample because of fussiness (5), failure to
pull the screen down during demonstration (4), or failure to pull the screen down
within 5 sec on three trials during familiarization (7).1
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Equipment
The two apparati were identical except the screen was transparent in one and
opaque in the other (see Figure 1). The base of each was a piece of gray-painted ply-
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1The high rate of attrition during the demonstration and training phases might seem to support the
means–end deficit account. However, there was no means–end problem to solve during training because
the toy had not yet been introduced. Moreover, the attrition rate does not weaken the argument that even
after infants passed the demonstration and training criteria, other factors prevented them from searching
for hidden toys.
wood (33 cm × 13 cm). The reverse side of the base was covered with gray felt. Two
black-painted wooden tracks (1.5 cm × 45 cm × 0.75 cm) constrained the motion of
the apparatus. Each screen was glued into a 25.5-cm groove cut into a gray-painted
dowel (29.5 cm × 1 cm) placed across the center of the base. The ends of the dowel
rested in 1-cm holes cut into two gray-painted wooden blocks (2 cm × 7.5 cm × 6.5
cm) nailed to the left and right sides of the base. The dowel rested approximately 0.5
cm above the base.
The motion of the screen from 0° to 115° was stopped by a 0.5 cm × 3.75 cm
piece of clear plastic tubing glued to the left block. The transparent screen (25.5 cm
× 12.5 cm) was a piece of Plexiglas covered with clear laminating plastic and ten
0.5 cm × 25.5 cm horizontal stripes of white contact paper 0.5 cm apart. The
opaque screen (25.5 cm × 12.5 cm) consisted of Plexiglas covered by white contact
paper. A gray-painted wooden toy platform (6.5 cm × 7.5 cm × 2 cm), 5 cm behind
the dowel and centered in the base, prevented the dowel from obstructing the in-
fant’s view of the toy. The stimuli were 10 toys approximately 6 cm × 5 cm × 6 cm.
The apparati were specifically designed to prevent infants from retrieving the
toy with a direct reach. The 115° angle of the screens required infants to pull the
screen toward them. The screens were large enough so that infants who reached di-
rectly for the visible toy in the center would not accidentally contact the top or side
edges of the screen, which were the means to pulling the screen down.
The experimenter timed the events using an audiotape of a metronome that
beeped once per second. A videocamera recorded the infant.
Design and Procedure
We used a 2 (familiarization condition) × 2 (testing condition) × 2 (screen type) × 2
(toy presence) factorial design, with familiarization and testing conditions as be-
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FIGURE 1 The transparent and
opaque apparati with the screens in both
up and down positions.
tween-participant factors and screen type and toy presence as within-participants
factors. The two familiarization orders counterbalanced the screen with which the
infant was familiarized first. The two testing orders counterbalanced toys with
screen type: All participants saw each toy on the same trial, but half saw it with the
transparent screen and half with the opaque screen. Infants had five repeated trials
of the four test events in blocks of four, with random event order within each block,
for a total of 20 test trials.
The infant sat in an infant seat fastened to the table, with the parent directly be-
hind. We familiarized infants with each screen in four phases prior to test. A dem-
onstration phase introduced the apparatus and allowed the infant to manipulate it.
A training phase familiarized infants with how to pull the screen down. A habitua-
tion phase bored infants with pulling the screen down to reduce the possibility that
infants would pull the screen down on test trials merely because they were still in-
terested in playing with the screen rather than as a means to get the toy. Finally, a
toy phase familiarized infants with the resting location of the toy on test trials. In-
fants first received the demonstration and training phases with one screen, fol-
lowed by the other screen. Infants then received the habituation and toy phases
with the first screen, followed by the second.
The demonstration phase began with the apparatus in the center of the table and
the screen raised. The experimenter moved the screen down and up until the infant
attended to it for several passes. The experimenter left the screen raised and
pushed the apparatus to the infant (2.5 sec). If the infant hesitated to explore the ap-
paratus, the experimenter asked the parent to encourage the infant to pull the
screen down. There was no time limit. The demonstration phase ended when the
infant pulled the screen down past the point where he or she could see the toy plat-
form over the top of the screen.
In the training phase, each trial began with the apparatus in the center of the
table and the screen lying flat. The experimenter tapped her fingers behind the
toy platform until the infant looked, while calling the infant by name. The exper-
imenter then raised the screen and pushed the apparatus to the infant. When the
apparatus stopped moving, the experimenter began to time the trial. Each trial
ended when the infant pulled the screen down or 5 sec elapsed. If the infant
failed to pull the screen down after several trials, the experimenter let the trial
continue longer than 5 sec, repeated the demonstration phase, or asked the par-
ent to encourage the infant to pull the screen down. The training phase ended af-
ter the infant pulled the screen down within 5 sec on any three trials without
assistance.
Habituation trials were identical to training trials. Habituation ended when the
infant failed to pull the screen down for two consecutive trials, or after 12 trials
passed.
The toy phase began with the apparatus at the center of the table and the screen
lying flat. The experimenter placed a toy on the toy platform and tapped her fingers
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behind the toy platform until the infant looked, while calling the infant by name.
The apparatus was pushed to the infant, with the screen remaining flat, allowing
the infant to reach directly for the toy. There was no time limit.
There were four test events: transparent–toy, transparent–no toy, opaque–toy
and opaque–no toy. Toy trials began with the placement of the toy on the toy plat-
form and were otherwise identical to training and habituation trials. No-toy trials
were identical to training and habituation trials. Toy trials ended when 5 sec
elapsed or when the infant pulled the screen down. No-toy trials ended when 5 sec
elapsed regardless of whether the infant pulled the screen down, to avoid condi-
tioning infants to reach at ceiling levels by rewarding them with the end of the trial
as soon as they pulled the screen down.
Measures and Interobserver Reliability
The main dependent measure assessed whether or not the infant pulled the
screen down far enough to see over the top to the toy platform. Retrieval was not
used as the dependent measure because there was no toy on half the trials. To
address any concerns that infants who reached directly for the toy behind the
transparent screen might reflexively grasp the screen and unintentionally pull it
down, direct reaches were also measured on transparent–toy trials. A direct
reach consisted of extending one or both hands toward the screen in the center,
near the object, rather than near the top or side edges. For both measures, two
observers coded all trials for half the infants. Agreement was 99% for pulling
the screen down (i.e., 158 of 160 judgments) and 93% for direct reaches (i.e., 37
of 40 judgments).
RESULTS
A 2 (familiarization condition) × 2 (testing condition) × 2 (screen type) × 2 (toy
presence) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the dependent measure of pulling the
screen down revealed an interaction of screen type and toy presence, F(1, 12) =
6.33, p < .05. As predicted, infants discriminated more between toy presence and
toy absence with the transparent than the opaque screen (left side of Figure 2). In-
fants pulled the screen down on 82% (SE = 6.80) of transparent–toy trials and 44%
(SE = 7.12) of transparent–no toy trials. In contrast, the values were 51% (SE =
8.56) for opaque–toy trials and 39% (SE = 7.18) for opaque–no toy trials. A main
effect of toy presence also demonstrated that infants pulled the screens down more
often when a toy was present (M = 67%, SE = 6.50) than when it was absent (M =
41%, SE = 6.45), F(1, 12) = 15.14, p < .01. A main effect of screen type also indi-
cated that infants pulled down the transparent screen (M = 63%, SE = 5.53) more
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than the opaque screen (M = 45%, SE = 6.39), F(1, 12) = 11.63, p < .01.2 No other
main effects or interactions were significant (all Fs < 2).
To address any concerns that infants may have inadvertently pulled the trans-
parent screen down while attempting to reach directly through the screen for the
object, trials on which such direct reaches occurred were excluded in a subse-
quent ANOVA. The same pattern of results emerged (right side of Figure 2).
There was a significant interaction of screen type and toy presence, F(1, 10) =
7.87, p < .05. Infants pulled the screen down on 96% (SE = 3.57) of transpar-
ent–toy trials and 43% (SE = 8.08) of transparent–no toy trials. In contrast, the
values were 53% (SE = 9.75) for opaque–toy trials and 37% (SE = 8.08) for
opaque–no toy trials. A main effect of toy presence indicated that infants pulled
the screens down more often when a toy was present (M = 75%, SE = 5.85) than
when it was absent (M = 40%, SE = 7.34), F(1, 10) = 32.25, p < .001. A main ef-
fect of screen type also revealed that infants pulled down the transparent screen
(M = 70%, SE = 4.76) more than the opaque screen (M = 45%, SE = 7.90), F(1,
10) = 22.81, p < .01. No other main effects or interactions were significant (all
Fs < 2). There was no evidence to indicate that infants received an unfair advan-
tage in the transparent case by pulling the screen down unintentionally while at-
tempting to reach directly for the toy.
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FIGURE 2 Percentage of trials on which infants pulled the screen down, by screen type and
toy presence (left side of figure). The same pattern emerged when direct reaches were excluded
(right side of figure).
2Infants did not simply find the transparent screen inherently more interesting. Analyses of training
and habituation data revealed that infants took no longer to reach the training criterion or the habituation
criterion with one screen than with the other (all Fs < 3). The main effect of screen during test trials re-
sults from the interaction: Infants pulled the screen down more in the transparent–toy condition than in
the other three conditions.
DISCUSSION
The major finding was that even when infants could not ignore the transparent
screen, they discriminated more between toy presence and toy absence with the
transparent screen than with the opaque one. Thus, failure to retrieve hidden objects
cannot be due solely to a means–end deficit or to an ability to ignore transparent
barriers. These findings are not unique to this particular means–end task. Infants re-
trieve objects more often from transparent barriers than from opaque barriers re-
gardless of whether they remove a cover, pull a towel, push a button, reach through
a curtain, or reach into liquids (Bower & Wishart, 1972; Munakata et al., 1997;
Shinskey, 2000). Furthermore, the experiment controlled for factors that previous
research with transparent barriers has not. Specifically, infants could not ignore the
transparent barrier and still succeed in retrieving the object. These results address
the limitations of previous studies to challenge the means–end deficit account.
We stress that our results demonstrate that means–end deficits cannot be the
sole source of infants’ search failures, not that such deficits play no role in search
failures. Such deficits may play a more critical role for infants younger than 7
months. Nevertheless, even after infants master the required means–end skills,
they use them less with hidden than visible objects. Something other than
means–end deficits must contribute to infants’ search failures. Thus, despite the
prevalence of the means–end account of infants’ search failures, the puzzle re-
mains regarding why infants simultaneously succeed and fail at different tasks de-
signed to measure the same knowledge of hidden objects.
Theories of cognitive development must be broad enough to reconcile such si-
multaneous successes and failures. Our results challenge approaches that attribute
early sensitivity to innate knowledge or highly constrained learning mechanisms
and discount failures as due to ancillary deficits (Baillargeon, 1994; Diamond,
1991). Several alternative approaches exist. According to the graded representa-
tions account (e.g., Munakata et al., 1997), infants’ mental representations of hidden
objects strengthen with development; infants can demonstrate sensitivity to hidden
objects in violation-of-expectation studies with a relatively weak representation but
need a stronger representation to guide action in a reaching task. Likewise, infants
may require stronger representations to search for objects behind occluders than to
search for themin thedarkbecauseoccludersprovidevisibleevidencecontradicting
the presence of the hidden object, whereas there is simply no visible evidence in the
dark. In other words, the memory demands on the representations may be greater in
the light than in the dark. Alternatively, different neural pathways may account for
the differences in looking and reaching: An early-developing visual pathway may
guide looking, whereas a later-developing action pathway may guide reaching (e.g.,
Bertenthal, 1996; Spelke, Vishton, & von Hofsten, 1995). A related possibility is
that looking and reaching tasks draw on two distinct types of representations, rather
than one ranging along a continuum (e.g., Munakata, 2001; Schacter & Moscovitch,
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1984). Further research exploring these approaches may advance our understanding
of the nature of early cognitive development.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The study was supported by grants from the National Institute for Child Health and
Development (1R29 HD37163-01) and the National Science Foundation
(IBN-9873492). We thank Elizabeth Weinberger for help in apparatus construction
and scheduling appointments with parents, Jeremy Weltman for help in apparatus
construction, Mario Garcia for interobserver reliability coding, and the members of
the Cognitive Development Center for their helpful feedback.
REFERENCES
Baillargeon, R. (1993). The object concept revisited: New directions in the investigation of infants’
physical knowledge. In C. Granrud (Ed.), Visual perception and cognition in infancy (pp. 265–315).
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Baillargeon, R. (1994). How do infants learn about the physical world? Current Directions in Psycho-
logical Science, 3, 133–139.
Baillargeon, R., Graber, M., DeVos, J., & Black, J. (1990). Why do young infants fail to search for hid-
den objects? Cognition, 36, 255–284.
Bertenthal, B. I. (1996). Origins and early development of perception, action, and representation. An-
nual Review of Psychology, 47, 431–459.
Bower, T. G. R., & Wishart, J. G. (1972). The effects of motor skill on object permanence. Cognition, 1,
165–172.
Clifton, R. K., Rochat, P., Litovsky, R. Y., & Perris, E. E. (1991). Object representation guides infants’
reaching in the dark. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 17, 323–329.
Diamond, A. (1991). Neuropsychological insights into the meaning of object concept development. In
S. Carey & R. Gelman (Eds.), The epigenesis of mind (pp. 67–110). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Hood, B., & Willatts, P. (1986). Reaching in the dark to an object’s remembered position: Evidence for
object permanence in 5-month-old infants. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, 57–65.
Munakata, Y. (2001). Task-dependency in infant behavior: Toward an understanding of the processes
underlying cognitive development. In F. Lacerda, C. von Hofsten, & M. Heimann (Eds.), Emerging
cognitive abilities in early infancy (pp. 29–52). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Munakata, Y., Bauer, D., Stackhouse, T., & Tobiasson, J. (2000). Rich interpretation vs. deflationary
accounts in cognitive development: The case of means–ends skills in 7-month-old infants. Manu-
script submitted for publication.
Munakata, Y., McClelland, J. L., Johnson, M. H., & Siegler, R. S. (1997). Rethinking infant knowledge:
Toward an adaptive process account of successes and failures in object permanence tasks. Psycho-
logical Review, 104, 686–713.
Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic.
Schacter, D., & Moscovitch, M. (1984). Infants, amnesics, and dissociable memory systems. In M.
Moscovitch (Ed.), Advances in the study of communication and affect: Vol. 9. Infant memory (pp.
173–216). New York: Plenum.
DETECTING TRANSPARENT BARRIERS 403
Shinskey, J. L. (2000). Infants’ search failures: Can we still milk the means–end deficit account? Manu-
script submitted for publication.
Shinskey, J. L., Bogartz, R. S., & Poirier, C. R. (2000). The effects of graded occlusion on manual search
and visual attention in 5- to 8-month-old infants. Infancy, 1, 323–346.
Spelke, E., Breinlinger, K., Macomber, J., & Jacobson, K. (1992). Origins of knowledge. Psychological
Review, 99, 605–632.
Spelke, E. S., Vishton, P., & von Hofsten, C. (1995). Object perception, object-directed action, and
physical knowledge in infancy. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences (pp. 165–179).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wynn, K. (1992). Addition and subtraction by human infants. Nature, 358, 749–750.
404 SHINSKEY AND MUNAKATA
